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Abstract
We describe a two-message protocol that enables a purely classical verifier to delegate
any quantum computation to an untrusted quantum prover. The protocol begins with the
verifier publishing a problem instance together with a public cryptographic key. The prover
then transmits the computation result, appropriately encoded. Finally, the verifier uses their
private key to detect any cheating and extract the result.
We achieve this by upgrading the verification protocol of Mahadev in two steps. First, the
protocol is repeated many times in parallel, yielding a four-message protocol with negligible
soundness error. This enables the second step: the “challenge round” is eliminated via the
Fiat-Shamir transform, in which the prover computes their own challenges using a public
hash function.
We show that this protocol is secure under the same assumptions underlying many can-
didate schemes for post-quantum public-key cryptography. Specifically, it is secure in the
Quantum Random Oracle Model, and assuming the quantum hardness of the Learning with
Errors problem. The main technical advance in our security proof is a parallel repetition
theorem for the Mahadev protocol.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Quantum verification. Quantum computing devices can apparently solve problems that are
infeasible for classical computers. As significant progress is made toward constructing quantum
computers, a major challenge is the verification of such devices, particularly as they reach scales
that rule out direct classical simulation.
One approach is to test for violations of Bell’s inequality [Bel64, CHSH69]. The self-testing
technique introduced by Mayers and Yao [MY04] has been extended into various verification
schemes [RUV13, McK16, GKW15, HPDF15, FH15, NV17, CGJV19]. In these schemes, multiple
entangled quantum provers can be verified by an efficient classical verifier, with information-
theoretic security. However, verification schemes based on quantum nonlocality require enforcing
spacelike separations between the provers, making it unlikely that they have implications for
verification of a single quantum device. That challenge has been studied in various relaxed
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settings, and several results have shown that a classical verifier with limited quantum resources
(e.g., performing a fixed set of quantum operations on a small number of qubits) may verify any
language in BQP [ABOE08,BFK09,Bro18,MF16,ABOEM17].
In a major breakthrough, Mahadev recently described the first secure protocol enabling a
purely classical verifier to certify the quantum computations of a single untrusted quantum
prover [Mah18]. The Mahadev protocol uses a quantum-secure cryptographic assumption to
give the classical verifier leverage over the quantum prover. Specifically, the protocol is sound
under the assumption that the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem does not admit a polynomial-
time quantum algorithm. This assumption is widely accepted, and underlies some of the most
promising candidates for the eventual replacement of RSA and ECC as the standard for public-
key cryptography [AASA+19].
The Mahadev protocol. From a theoretical perspective, Mahadev’s result settled a major open
question concerning the power of quantum-prover interactive arguments (QPIAs). In a QPIA, two
computationally-bounded parties interact: a quantum prover and a classical verifier. The veri-
fier’s goal is to use the added power of the prover to solve a decision problem. The completeness
error of a QPIA is the probability of the verifier failing to accept a YES instance even though the
prover is honest. The soundness error is the probability that the verifier accepts a NO instance
when interacting with a dishonest prover. In these terms, Mahadev’s result showed that there is
a four-round1 QPIA for BQP with negligible completeness error and constant soundness error
δ < 1. Of course, one can repeat the protocol in series to suppress the soundness error, at the cost
of many additional rounds of interaction. A natural question is whether this can be improved
significantly. Ideally, we would like to simultaneously reduce both the soundness error and the
number of interaction rounds.
The Mahadev protocol has a high-level structure analogous to that of classical Σ-protocols
[Dam02]. The goal of the verifier is to decide whether an input Hamiltonian H from a certain
class is a YES instance or a NO instance for BQP.
1. The verifier V generates a private-public key pair (sk, pk) and sends pk to the prover P ;
2. P prepares the ground state of H and then coherently evaluates a certain classical function
fpk. This yields a state of the form
∑
x
αx|x〉X | fpk(x)〉Y , (1)
where the ground state is in a subregister of register X. P measures the output register Y
and sends the result y to V . Note that P now holds a superposition over the preimages of
y.
3. V replies with a uniformly random challenge bit c ∈ {0, 1}.
4. If c = 0 (“test round”), P measures the X register in the computational basis and sends the
outcome. If c = 1 (“Hadamard round”), P measures X in the Hadamard basis and sends
the outcome.
1We take one round to mean a single one-way message from the prover to the verifier, or vice-versa. The Mahadev
protocol involves four such messages.
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After the four message rounds above are completed, the verifier uses their knowledge of H and
the secret key sk to either accept or reject the instance H.
1.2 Our approach
In this work, we show that the Mahadev protocol can be carried out in only two rounds, while
simultaneously reducing the soundness error to negligible. Before describing our approach, we
make a brief remark about round-optimality. In delegation of computations, it is plausible to
suppose that the client needs to send a description of the desired computation (in some form)
to the server. In such a setting, our protocol is clearly round-optimal. We remark that, with our
protocol, a verifier can publish a single public key and then receive arbitrarily many proofs (i.e.,
second-round messages) from different provers.
Theoretically, one could ask for more: a protocol where the prover and the verifier both receive
the instance from some third party, and then the prover simply sends a proof to the verifier. While
we cannot rule such a protocol out, constructing it seems like a major challenge. In fact, it may
even be impossible. In such a setting, the proof must be independent of the secret randomness
of the verifier. This seems to make it difficult to apply the “cryptographic leash” technique of
Mahadev’s protocol. On the other hand, without cryptographic assumptions, a protocol such as
this would immediately place BQP in MA, which is almost certainly false [Aar10].
Warmup: a non-interactive test of quantumness. To explain our approach, we first briefly de-
scribe how to make the “cryptographic test of quantumness” of [BCM+18] into a non-interactive
protocol. This is a significantly simplified version of the Mahadev protocol, where the verifier’s
goal is now only to ensure that the prover is not classical. At a high level, the test proceeds just as
the verification protocol, with two modifications. First, there is no ground state encoded in the
X register. Second, the initial state (1) is simply in uniform superposition over X. This protocol
has soundness error 1/2, meaning that a classical prover can convince the verifier to accept with
probability at most 1/2 [BCM+18]. A quantum prover can easily answer both challenges, so the
completeness is 1.
To reduce the interaction in this protocol, we perform two transformations. First, we repeat
the protocol independently in parallel k times, with the verifier accepting if and only if all k
copies accept. This enables the next transformation: we remove Round 3 by asking the prover to
compute the challenge coins c = (c1, c2, . . . , ck) := H(y1, y2, . . . , yk) themselves via a public hash
function H (e.g., SHA-3). This allows the prover to go directly to Round 4, i.e., measuring the X
registers. The result is a two-message protocol: the verifier simply sends k keys (pk1, pk2, . . . , pkk)
in the first message, and the prover responds with k initial and final measurement outcomes
(y1, y2, . . . , yk) and (x1, x2, . . . , xk). The verifier then performs the k-fold accept/reject verdict
calculations, using coins c computed as above.
Whereas the BQP verification protocol uses a private-public key pair that depends on the
computation to be verified, the cryptographic test of quantumness uses keys drawn from a fixed
distribution. In this sense, the test of quantumness can be viewed as non-interactive following
an initial setup phase.
Why is this protocol secure? First, recall that the soundness statement is only about classical
provers. As the verifier is also classical, our arguments about security can rest on purely classical
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results. Thus we can apply standard parallel repetition theorems for classical protocols [Hai09,
HPWP10,BHT19] to conclude that the parallel-repeated protocol has negligible soundness error.2
By the classical security of the so-called Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS86], the final two-message
protocol also has negligible soundness [BR95, PS00]. We note that the second result holds in
the so-called Random Oracle Model (ROM), an idealized but fairly standard model in classical
cryptography [BR95]. We discuss these issues in more detail below.
Our approach to transforming the full Mahadev protocol for verifying BQP into a two-round
protocol follows the same approach. The protocol transformations are unchanged: parallel repeti-
tion, followed by the Fiat-Shamir transformation. However, soundness now needs to hold against
quantum provers, and we can no longer rely on classical results about these transformations. We
now discuss these issues and expand on the above discussion.
Parallel repetition. Any protocol can be amplified with sequential repetition. If the original
protocol has soundness error δ, the k-fold repeated protocol will have soundness error δk. How-
ever, this comes at the cost of an increased number of interaction rounds. Parallel repetition
is more desirable, but does not always reduce the soundness error, not even in the case of
purely classical protocols. Bellare, Impagliazzo, and Naor [BIN97] showed that there exists a
4-round classical argument for which soundness error remains the same under parallel repeti-
tion. Whereas parallel repetition reduces the soundness error at an optimal rate for public-coin
protocols [PV07,CL10,CP15], the challenging case is that of private-coin protocols, i.e., protocols
in which the verifier holds private randomness that cannot be revealed to the prover. A sequence
of works showed that parallel repetition does in fact reduce the soundness error of any classical
private-coin protocol, provided the protocol is slightly modified to include “random termina-
tions” with low probability [Hai09,HPWP10,BHT19].
Does parallel repetition work for quantum-prover interactive arguments? The Mahadev pro-
tocol is a natural case to consider since it already exhibits the full decisional power of QPIAs,
i.e., BQP. However, several complications arise when attempting to establish parallel repetition
using classical techniques. First, the Mahadev protocol is clearly private-coin, precisely the cate-
gory that is challenging even in the classical case. Second, classical proofs of parallel repetition
typically involve constructing a prover (for the single-copy protocol) that uses many rounds of
nested rejection sampling. The quantum analogue of such a procedure is quantum rewinding,
which can only be applied in special circumstances [Wat09,ARU14] and seems difficult to apply
to parallel repetition.
In this work, we establish a new parallel repetition theorem with alternative techniques,
suited specifically for the Mahadev protocol. We show that, for NO instances, the accepting
paths of the verifier for the two different challenges (c = 0 and c = 1) correspond to two nearly
(computationally) orthogonal projectors. We also establish that this persists in k-fold parallel rep-
etition, meaning that each pair of distinct challenge strings c, c′ ∈ {0, 1}k corresponds to nearly
orthogonal projectors. From there, a straightforward argument shows that the prover cannot
succeed for more than a non-negligible fraction of challenge strings. Our result shows that k-
fold parallel repetition yields the same optimal soundness error δk as sequential repetition. The
resulting protocol is a four-round QPIA for verifying BQP, with negligible completeness and
2A slight subtlety is that this is a private-coin protocol. However, the “test” branch (c = 0) is publicly simulable
so [HPWP10] applies. Alternatively, one can apply [Hai09] to the “random-terminating” variant of the protocol.
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soundness errors.
Fiat-Shamir transformation. The second and final step is to eliminate the “challenge round” of
the k-fold parallel protocol. Note that in the k-fold protocol, the second message of the verifier
to the prover is a uniformly random c ∈ {0, 1}k . To eliminate the need for this message round,
we adopt an established approach from classical cryptography: the aforementioned Fiat-Shamir
transform. In this approach, the prover is asked to generate the challenge bits c ∈ {0, 1}k them-
selves by evaluating a public hash function H on the transcript of the protocol thus far. In our
case, recalling (1), this means that the prover selects c := H(H, pk, y). Note that pk and y are
now both k-tuples, since we are transforming the k-fold protocol. The resulting protocol now has
only two messages: the initial message (H, pk) from the verifier, and the response (y, x) from
the prover. Of course, the verifier also needs to adapt their actions at the verdict stage, using
c = H(H, pk, y) when deciding whether to accept or reject.
Clearly, the soundness of the transformed protocol now depends crucially on the properties
of the hash functionH. A standard assumption when applying Fiat-Shamir is thatH behaves like
a uniformly random function. In practice, this is a reasonable assumption: standardized hash
functions are typically not distinguishable from random in any nontrivial3 way. This approach
has the advantage of enabling a number of strategies for giving security proofs. Specifically, we
work in an idealized model called the Random Oracle Model (ROM), which assumes that all
parties in the protocol have black-box access to a uniformly random oracle function H. In the
ROM, one can show that the Fiat-Shamir transformation is secure, in the sense that it preserves
soundness up to a loss that is negligible provided H has a superpolynomially-large range [BR95,
PS00]. It is straightforward to see that this last condition is required; it is also the reason for
applying parallel repetition prior to the Fiat-Shamir transformation.
A complication in the quantum setting is that quantum computers can evaluate any public
classical function in superposition via the unitary operator
UH : |x〉|y〉 7→ |x〉|y⊕H(x)〉 . (2)
This means that we must work in the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM) [BDF+11], which
grants all parties oracle access to UH. Proving the security of transformations like Fiat-Shamir
(FS) in the QROM is the subject of recent research, and newly developed techniques have largely
shown that FS in the QROM preserves soundness for so-called sigma-protocols [DFMS19,LZ19].
Extending those results so that they also apply to the Mahadev protocol is relatively straightfor-
ward.
1.3 Technical summary of results
Our results are summarized in the following two theorems. The soundness of our protocols is
conditioned on the assumption that there is no polynomial-time quantum algorithm for solving
the Learning with Errors (or LWE) problem [Reg05]. This assumption is needed for the sound-
ness of the Mahadev protocol itself; we do not apply it anywhere else in our arguments. As
the assumption is an asymptotic statement, all the protocols are parameterized4 by a security
3There are trivial but not useful ways to distinguish, such as simply observing that H has an efficient circuit.
4To see how to parameterize LWE concretely, see, e.g., [BLP+13].
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parameter λ. The running time of all the relevant algorithms is then polynomial in λ, and the
cryptographic assumption is that the success probability of any algorithm for solving LWE is
bounded by a negligible function of λ. We refer to this below as the LWE hardness assumption. For
simplicity, in our exposition we will assume that λ is some polynomial in the input BQP instance
size n, so that efficient algorithms run in time poly(n) and errors are (ideally) negl(n) (where
negl(n) denotes a superpolynomially small function of n).
We first state the parallel repetition result.
Theorem 1. Let M be the Mahadev protocol, and let Mk be its k-fold parallel repetition. Then Mk is a
four-round protocol for verifying the class BQP, such that
1. The completeness error of Mk is 1− negl(n).
2. Under the LWE hardness assumption, the soundness error of Mk is at most 2−k + negl(n).
For k = 1, we improve Mahadev’s bound on the soundness error (negligibly close to 3/4) to
1/2+ negl(n) [Mah18]. Our bound is optimal: there is a straightforward cheating prover who
succeeds in a test round with probability 1 and in a Hadamard round with negligible probability
(see Protocol 2).
As discused above, applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation to Mk results in a two-message
protocol. We state this formally as follows.
Theorem 2. Let FS(Mk) denote the protocol resulting from applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation
to the k-fold parallel repetition of the Mahadev protocol M. Then FS(Mk) is a two-round protocol for
verifying the class BQP, such that
1. The completeness error of FS(Mk) is 1− negl(n).
2. In the Quantum Random Oracle Model, under the LWE hardness assumption, the soundness error
of FS(Mk) is negl(n) provided k = ω(log n).
Related results. Several recent works have pursued research related to the protocols of [Mah18,
BCM+18]. These include the zero-knowledge protocol of Vidick and Zhang [VZ19] and the
remote state preparation protocol of Gheorghiu and Vidick [GV19].
Radian and Sattath [RS19] recently established what they call “a parallel repetition theorem
for NTCFs.” NTCFs are the functions fpk in the Mahadev protocol above. However, the context
of [RS19] is very different from that of our Theorem 1. They work with 1-of-2 puzzles, not BQP
verification; in particular, their soundness experiment is quite different. Moreover, their parallel
repetition theorem follows from a purely classical result.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
quantum prover interactive arguments, the local Hamiltonian problem as it relates to BQP ver-
ification, and the Mahadev protocol. In Section 3, we show that parallel repetition reduces the
soundness error of the Mahadev protocol at the optimal rate. In Section 4, we show that under
the Fiat-Shamir transformation, a generalization of Σ-protocols (which includes the Mahadev pro-
tocol) remains secure in the QROM. Finally, we combine these results to establish a 2-message
protocol for BQP in Section 5.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and conventions
Most algorithms we consider are efficient, i.e., run in time polynomial in the size of the input
(typically denoted by n) and the security parameter (typically denoted by λ). The two main
classes of algorithms are PPT (probabilistic, polynomial-time) and QPT (quantum polynomial-
time.) We let negl(n) denote a superpolynomially small function of n, i.e., a function in 2−ω(logn).
Recall that, given a classical circuit for a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, one can easily con-
struct a reversible (and hence also quantum) circuit for the operation
f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m
(x, y) 7→ (x, y⊕ f (x)) ,
with at most constant overhead. We let U f denote the unitary operator implemented by this
quantum circuit.
2.2 Quantum-prover interactive arguments
A quantum-prover interactive argument (QPIA) is an interactive protocol between two polynomially-
bounded parties, a quantum prover and a classical verifier, interacting over a classical channel.
A QPIA is described by a pair of algorithms: the PPT algorithm of the honest verifier V , and the
QPT algorithm of the honest prover P .
Given an arbitrary prover P ′ and verifier V ′, we let b ← [P ′ ≀ V ′](x) denote the process in
which P ′ and V ′ interact for a given input x and produce an output b ∈ {accept, reject}.
Definition 3. Fix a language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ and a QPIA (P ,V).
• We say that (P ,V) is a QPIA for L with completeness c if, for all x ∈ L, Pr[accept ← [P ≀
V](x)] ≥ c. The completeness error is 1− c.
• We say that (P ,V) is a QPIA for L with soundness error s if, for all x /∈ L and for all QPT
algorithms P ′, Pr[accept ← [P ′ ≀ V ](x)] ≤ s. The soundness is 1− s.
Two standard approaches to amplifying the soundness of a QPIA (P ,V) are as follows.
• (Serial repetition) We run bj ← [P ≀ V ], k times in series, with the verifier finally outputting
accept if and only if bj = accept for all j.
• (Parallel repetition) We run bj ← [P ≀ V ], k times in parallel, with the verifier finally out-
putting accept if and only if bj = accept for all j. By “parallel” we mean that we first
initialize k copies of V, then send the first messages of each copy to the prover, then send
back k responses, and so on.
It is straightforward to check that serial repetition suppresses soundness error exponentially in
k. A similar result for parallel repetition is false in general [BIN97,PW07], and is typically much
more challenging to prove in cases where it holds.
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2.3 The local Hamiltonian problem and verification for BQP
Any promise problem L = (Lyes, Lno) ∈ QMA can be reduced to the local Hamiltonian problem
such that for x ∈ Lyes, the Hamiltonian Hx has a low-energy ground state |ψx〉, and for x ∈ Lno,
all quantum states have large energy [KSV02]. While the quantum witness |ψx〉 may be hard
to prepare for general L ∈ QMA, it can be prepared efficiently if L ∈ BQP. Furthermore, the
problem remains QMA-complete even with a Hamiltonian that can be measured by performing
standard (Z) and Hadamard (X) basis measurements [BL08].
Problem 1 (The 2-local ZX-Hamiltonian problem [BL08,MF16]). The 2-local ZX-Hamiltonian promise
problem zx = (zxyes, zxno), with parameters a, b and gap (b− a)−1 = poly(n), is defined as follows. An
instance is a local Hamiltonian
H = ∑
i
hiZi + ∑
i
∆iXi + ∑
i<j
JijZiXj + ∑
i<j
KijXiZj, (3)
where each of hi,∆i, Jij,Kij is a real number such that the summation ∑i(|hi| + |∆i|) + ∑i<j(|Jij| +
|Kij|) = poly(n) and each Xi (resp. Zi) is a Pauli X (resp. Pauli Z) gate acting on the ith qubit. For
H ∈ zxyes, the smallest eigenvalue of H is at most a, while if H ∈ zxno, the smallest eigenvalue of H is at
least b.
Note that any Hamiltonian H = ∑S dSS that is a linear combination of 2-local Pauli operators
can be replaced by H′ = 12(d
−1H + 1) where d := ∑S |dS|. Furthermore, since d = poly(n), the
gap of H′ is 12d (b− a) = 1/ poly(n). We consider the rescaled Hamiltonian since we can then
estimate the energy by sampling a local Pauli operator S with probability |dS|/d and performing
X or Z measurements, as in Protocol 1 below.
When working with Hamiltonian terms S, we overload the notation for convenience. First,
we write Sj to denote the Pauli operator assigned by S to qubit j, so that S =
⊗
j Sj. Second, we
write i ∈ S to indicate that i is a qubit index for which S does not act as the identity, i.e., Si 6= 1.
As mentioned above, the 2-local ZX Hamiltonian problem is QMA-complete [BL08], and thus
BQP-hard. Morimae and Fitzsimons present a protocol (the “MF protocol”) with a quantum
prover and a limited verifier, who only needs the ability to perform single-qubit X and Z basis
measurements [MF16]. In the MF protocol, under proper rescaling, we construct a Hamiltonian
H = ∑S pS
1+mSS
2 where the sum is over Pauli operators S, mS ∈ {+1,−1}, and p is a distribution
over Pauli operators. The prover P prepares a quantum state and sends each qubit round by
round to V , so V is not required to have large quantum memory. Then V samples a term S with
probability pS and performs the corresponding measurement on the associated qubits. Since
estimating the energy of 1±S2 can be done by performing Z or X basis measurements for Pauli
operator S, V is only required to be able to perform these measurements.
The Mahadev protocol [Mah18] (introduced in Section 2.4) builds upon the MF protocol and
removes the need for V to perform quantum measurements, thereby achieving purely classical
verification. To understand this construction, we consider a version of the MF protocol in which
P sends the entire state at once, as in Protocol 1.
Protocol 1 (Variant of the MF protocol).
Setup. P and V receive an instance of Problem 1, namely a Hamiltonian Hx = ∑S pS 1+mSS2 ,
where each S is a tensor product of X,Z,1.
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Round 1. P prepares a quantum state ρ and sends it to V .
Verdict. V samples a term S with probability pS and performs the measurement {M1 = 1+S2 ,M−1 =
1−S
2 } on ρ, getting an outcome e. V accepts if e = −mS.
Since MmS =
1+mSS
2 = 1−M−mS and Hx = ∑S pSMmS , the success probability of the protocol
with input state ρ is
∑
S
pStr(M−mSρ) = 1−∑
s
pStr(Mmsρ) = 1− tr(Hxρ). (4)
Assuming the completeness-soundness gap satisfies b − a > poly(|x|)−1, it may be efficiently
amplified by parallel repetition. Specifically, V receives a quantum witness for t copies of Hx
and samples T local terms for each copy. By setting the acceptance threshold to a+b2 T, both the
completeness error and the soundness error are suppressed to negligible with polynomial T(|x|)
(cf. [Mah18, Theorem 8.4]). For a detailed proof of QMA gap amplification, see [VW16, Section 3].
In the following discussion, the term S is encoded by an n-bit string h(S): for each qubit i ∈ S,
set hi = 0 for a Z basis measurement and hi = 1 for an X basis measurement. For other qubits,
set hi = 0 for concreteness. We let
αh,ρ := tr(M−mSρ) (5)
denote the success probability with ρ when h = h(S) is sampled in Protocol 1.
2.4 The Mahadev protocol for BQP verification
We now describe the Mahadev protocol in detail, starting with the required cryptographic prim-
itives.
Cryptographic primitives. The protocol relies crucially on two special classes of functions:
Noisy Trapdoor Claw-free Functions (NTCFs) F and Noisy Trapdoor Injective Functions (NTIFs)
G. Both classes of functions are constructed based on the presumed hardness of the Learning
with Errors (LWE) problem [BCM+18,Mah18]. We now sketch the properties of these function
families. For complete details, and for the LWE construction, see [BCM+18]. Let λ be a secu-
rity parameter and let q ≥ 2 be prime. Choose parameters ℓ = poly(λ), n = Ω(ℓ log q), and
m = Ω(n log q).
The NTCF family F = { fpk}pk∈KF is a family of keyed functions
fpk : {0, 1} × X → DY (6)
which, on input a public key pk ∈ KF := Zm×nq × Zmq , a bit b, and x ∈ X := Znq , outputs a
distribution fpk(b, x) over Y := Zmq . Each function fpk ∈ F satisfies the injective pair property:
there exists a perfect matching Rpk ⊂ X × X such that fpk(0, x0) = fpk(1, x1) if and only if
(x0, x1) ∈ Rpk.
The NTCF family is equipped with four polynomial-time algorithms (GenF , ChkF , InvF , SampF ),
defined as follows.
1. GenF , on input 1λ, outputs a secret-public key pair (sk, pk).
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2. ChkF is a deterministic algorithm for checking if (b, x) and y form a preimage-image pair
of fpk. On input b, x, y, ChkF outputs 1 iff y ∈ supp ( fpk(b, x)).
3. InvF is a deterministic algorithm for inverting the function fpk. On input secret key sk, bit
b, and image y, InvF returns the preimage xb,y such that y ∈ supp ( fpk(b, xb,y)), or outputs
reject if no such preimage exists.
4. SampF is an efficient quantum process which, on input pk and b ∈ {0, 1}, returns a quan-
tum state negligibly close to
1
|X |1/2 ∑x∈X
|b〉|x〉|ψ fpk(b,x)〉, (7)
where |ψp〉 := ∑y∈Y
√
p(y)|y〉 for distribution p. By the injective pair property, we have
〈ψ fpk(b,x)|ψ fpk(b′,x′)〉 = 1 if (b, x) = (b′, x′), or there exists (x0, x1) ∈ Rpk such that (b, x, b′, x′) =
(0, x0, 1, x1) or (1, x1, 0, x0). This implies that the states in {|ψ fpk(b,x)〉} can be perfectly distin-
guished by performing a standard basis measurement. Thus, intuitively, we may consider
an ideal version of these functions, i.e., the distribution p is concentrated at a single point.
Similarly, the NTIF family G = {gpk}pk∈KG is a family of keyed functions
gpk : {0, 1} × X → DY (8)
which, on input a public key pk ∈ KG , a bit b, and x ∈ X , outputs a distribution gpk(b, x) over
Y . Instead of the injective pair property of NTCFs, NTIFs satisfy an injectivity property: for
all (x, b) 6= (x′, b′), supp gpk(b, x) ∩ supp gpk(b′, x′) = ∅. An NTIF family is also equipped with
a tuple of four polynomial-time algorithms (GenG , ChkG , InvG , SampG), and these are defined
exactly as in the NTCF case (but with g in place of f , and G instead of F .)
We remark that the states (7) prepared by SampF and SampG should be compared with the
“idealized” state described in (1) in our initial sketch of the protocol.
The protocol. The Mahadev protocol [Mah18] for BQP verification allows V to request an X
or Z basis measurement outcome without revealing the basis to P . The aim of the protocol is
to verify that the prover’s response, when appropriately decoded, is close to the measurement
outcomes of some n-qubit quantum state ρ. Crucially, this guarantee will hold simultaneously
for all basis choices h ∈ {0, 1}n, where 0 denotes a Z basis measurement and 1 denotes an X
basis measurement. With this guarantee, the verifier can then apply the verification procedure of
the MF protocol to the decoded responses of the prover, knowing that this will correctly decide
whether the instance should be accepted or rejected.
In the following protocol, for each qubit, if V requests a Z basis measurement, then an NTIF
key is sent; if V requests an X basis measurement, then an NTCF key is sent. Since ChkF and
ChkG are identical, we denote them by Chk. Similarly, SampF and SampG are identical, so we
denote them by Samp.
We now describe the protocol, as it takes place between an honest verifier V and an honest
prover P .
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Protocol 2 (Mahadev protocol).
Setup. Choose a security parameter λ ≥ n. Both P and V receive an instance of Problem 1, namely
H = ∑S pS
1+mSS
2 .
Round 1. V samples a term S and computes h = h(S).
For each qubit i, if hi = 0, V samples (ski, pki) ← GenG(1λ); otherwise V samples
(ski, pki)← GenF (1λ). V sends pk = (pki)ni=1 to P .
Round 2. P prepares the n-qubit ground state |φ〉 = ∑b∈{0,1}n φb|b〉W of H in register W. For each
qubit Wj in W, P performs Samp on input the key pki coherently and yields a quantum
state negligibly close to
1
|X |n/2 ∑x∈X n ∑b∈{0,1}n
φb|b〉W |x〉X |ψ fpk(b,x)〉Y , (9)
where b = (b1, . . . , bn), x = (x1, . . . , xn) and |ψ fpk(b,x)〉 :=
⊗n
i=1 |ψ fpki (bi,xi)〉. Next, P
measures Y and sends the outcome y to V .
Round 3. V responds with a uniformly random “challenge” bit c ∈ {0, 1}. We call c = 0 “test
round” and c = 1 “Hadamard round,” and set labels t = 0 and h = 1.
Round 4. If c = t, P measures M = WX in the computational basis. If c = h, P measures WX in
the Hadamard basis. In either case, P sends the measurement outcome (w, t) to V ;
Verdict. In a test round, V accepts if Chk(pki,wi, ti, yi) = 1 for each bit i.
In a Hadamard round, V performs the following:
1. For each qubit i with hi = 0, run (ei, xbi,yi) ← InvG(ski, yi). For each qubit i
with hi = 1, run x0,yi ← InvF (ski, 0, yi) and x1,yi ← InvG(ski, 1, yi) to get both
preimages. Then compute ei = ti · (x0,yi ⊕ x1,yi)⊕ wi.
If any of the above the algorithms returns reject for any i, or ti is trivial (e.g., 0n,
see [BCM+18]), reject. Otherwise store e as the witness to the next check.
2. Discard all the bits of e but the ones specified in term S. Accept if the witness satisfies
M−mS (defined in Protocol 1).
The following is a paraphrase of the main result of [Mah18].
Theorem 4 (Theorems 1.1 and 8.6 in [Mah18]). Protocol 2 is a four-message quantum-prover interac-
tive argument for the class BQP with completeness error negl(n). Under the LWE hardness assumption,
the soundness error of Protocol 2 is 3/4+ negl(n).
3 A parallel repetition theorem for the Mahadev protocol
In a k-fold parallel repetition of Protocol 2, the honest prover runs the honest single-fold prover
independently for each copy of the protocol, while the honest verifier runs the single-fold verifier
independently for each copy, accepting if and only if all k single-fold verifiers accept. The com-
pleteness error clearly remains negligible. We now analyze the soundness error and establish a
parallel repetition theorem for the protocol.
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In preparation, we fix the following notation related to the Verdict stage of Protocol 2. First,
for each basis choice h ∈ {0, 1}n , the check Chk(pki,wi, ti, yi) = 1 is represented by a projection
Πh,sk,t acting on registers WXY. Specifically, this is the projector whose image is spanned by all
inputs (w, t, y) that are accepted by the verifier in the Verdict stage. Note that running Chk does
not require the trapdoor sk, but the relation implicitly depends on it. Second, the two Hadamard
round checks 1 and 2 are represented by projectors Λh,sk,h,1 and Λh,sk,h,2, respectively. These two
projectors commute since they are both diagonal in the standard basis. We define the overall
Hadamard round projector Πh,sk,h := Λh,sk,h,1Λh,sk,h,2.
3.1 A lemma for the single-copy protocol
We begin by showing an important fact about the single-copy protocol: the verifier’s accepting
paths associated to the two challenges (denoted t and h for “test” and “Hadamard,” respectively)
correspond to nearly orthogonal5 projectors. Moreover, in a certain sense this property holds
even for input states that are adaptively manipulated by a dishonest prover after he has learned
which challenge will take place. This fact is essential in our analysis of the parallel repetition of
many copies in the following sections.
The setup. As discussed in [Mah18], any prover P can be characterized as follows. First, pick
a state family |Ψpk〉; this state is prepared on registers WXYE after receiving pk. Here Y is the
register that will be measured in Round 2, W and X are the registers that will be measured in
Round 4, and E is the private workspace of P . Then, choose two unitaries Ut and Uh to describe
the Round 4 actions of P before any measurements, in the test round and Hadamard round,
respectively. Both Ut and Uh act on WXYE, but can only be classically controlled on Y, as they
must be implemented after P has measured Y and sent the result to the verifier. We will write
P = (|Ψpk〉,Ut,Uh), where it is implicit that |Ψpk〉 is a family of states parameterized by pk.
At the end of the protocol, the registers WXY will have been measured and given to the
verifier. Recall that we can view the final actions of the verifier as applying one of two measure-
ments: a test-round measurement, or a Hadamard-round measurement. Recall also that Πh,sk,t
and Πh,sk,h denote the “accept” projectors for those two measurements, respectively. We now
additionally define, for a given prover P ,
Π
Ut
h,sk,t := U
†
t (Πh,sk,t⊗ 1E)Ut ,
Π
Uh
h,sk,h := U
†
h(HWXΠh,sk,hHWX ⊗ 1E)Uh , (10)
where HWX denotes the Hadamard transform on registers WX, i.e., the Hadamard gate applied
to every qubit in those registers. These projectors have a natural interpretation: they describe the
action of the two accepting projectors of the verifier on the initial state |Ψpk〉 of the prover, taking
into account the (adaptive) attacks the prover will make in Round 4.
A key lemma. We now prove a fact about the single-copy protocol. The proof is largely a matter
of making some observations about the results from [Mah18], and then combining them in the
right way.
5Strictly speaking, the projectors are only nearly orthogonal when applied to states prepared by efficient provers.
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Recall that, for any instance H of the ZX-Hamiltonian problem (Problem 1), Protocol 2 begins
with the verifier V making a measurement basis choice h ∈ {0, 1}n for all the qubits. After inter-
acting with a prover P , the verifier either rejects or produces a candidate measurement outcome,
which is then tested as in the MF protocol (Protocol 1). We let DP ,h denote the distribution of
this candidate measurement outcome for a prover P and basis choice h, averaged over all mea-
surements and randomness of P and V . It is useful to compare DP ,h with an “ideal” distribution
Dρ,h obtained by simply measuring some n-qubit quantum state ρ (a candidate ground state)
according to the basis choices specified by h, with no protocol involved.
Lemma 5. Let P = (|Ψpk〉,Ut,Uh) be a prover in the Mahadev protocol such that, for every h ∈ {0, 1}n ,
E
sk
[〈Ψpk|ΠUth,sk,t|Ψpk〉] ≥ 1− negl(n) . (11)
Then there exists an efficiently preparable n-qubit quantum state ρ such that, for every h ∈ {0, 1}n ,
E
sk
[〈Ψpk|ΠUhh,sk,h|Ψpk〉] ≤ αh,ρ + negl(n) , (12)
where αh,ρ (defined in (5)) is the success probability in the MF protocol with basis choice h and quantum
state ρ.
Proof. Up to negligible terms, (11) means that P is what Mahadev calls a perfect prover. She
establishes two results ([Mah18, Claim 7.3] and [Mah18, Claim 5.7]) which, when taken together,
directly imply the following fact about perfect provers. For every perfect prover P , there exists an
efficiently preparable quantum state ρ such that DP ,h is computationally indistinguishable from
Dρ,h for all basis choices h ∈ {0, 1}n . In particular, the proof is obtained in two steps. First, for
every perfect prover, there exists a nearby “trivial prover” whose attack in a Hadamard round
commutes with standard basis measurement on the committed state [Mah18, Claim 5.7]. Second,
for every trivial prover, the distribution is computationally indistinguishable from measuring a
consistent quantum state ρ in any basis h [Mah18, Claim 7.3]. Technically, Mahadev shows this
for exactly perfect provers, but her proofs have straightforward relaxations to our “negligibly-far-
from-perfect” case.
Now consider two ways of producing a final accept/reject output of the verifier. In the first
case, an output is sampled from the distribution DP ,h and the verifier applies the final checks in
the Mahadev protocol. In this case, the final outcome is obtained by performing the measurement
{ΠUhh,sk,h,1− Π
Uh
h,sk,h} on the state |Ψpk〉, and accepting if the first outcome is observed. In the
second case, an output is sampled from the distribution Dρ,h and the verifier applies the final
checks in the MF protocol. In this case, the acceptance probability is αh,ρ simply by definition.
The result then follows directly.
We remark that Lemma 5 has the following interpretation in the soundness experiment. For
soundness, we are dealing with a NO instance, which implies that there is no ground state which
succeeds non-negligibly in the MF protocol. By the Lemma, for perfect provers the averaged
projection Esk[〈Ψpk|ΠUhh,sk,h|Ψpk〉] is then negligible. It follows that provers who succeed almost
perfectly in the test round must almost certainly fail in the Hadamard round. We emphasize
that this is the case even though the prover can adaptively change their state (by applying Ut
or Uh) after learning which round will take place. This formalizes the intuitive claim we made
at the beginning of the section about “adaptive orthogonality” of the two acceptance projectors
corresponding to the two round types.
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3.2 The parallel repetition theorem
Characterization of a prover in the k-fold protocol. We now discuss the behavior of a general
prover in a k-fold protocol. We redefine some notation we already used in the single-copy setting.
Let V be the verifier and P an arbitrary prover in the k-fold protocol.
In Round 1, V selects k terms of the instance H and records the corresponding basis choices
h = (h1, . . . , hk) ∈ ({0, 1}n)k. Then V samples key pairs (pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkk, skk), where each
(pkj, skj) is an n-tuple of key pairs selected according to hj. Then V sends pk = (pk1, . . . , pkk) to
the prover P in register PK = (PK1, . . . , PKk).
In Round 2, without loss of generality, the action of P prior to measurement is to apply a uni-
tary U0 = ∑pk |pk〉〈pk|PK ⊗ (U0,pk)WXYE to the input state |pk〉PK |0〉WXYE. Each of W,X,Y is now
a k-tuple of registers, and E is the prover’s workspace. To generate the “commitment” message
to V , P performs standard basis measurement on Y. We write |Ψpk〉WXYE = ∑y βy|Ψpk,y〉WXE|y〉Y.
When the measurement outcome is y, the side state P holds is then |Ψpk,y〉WXE. In the following
analysis of the success probability of P , we consider the superposition |Ψpk〉WXYE instead of a
classical mixture of the states |Ψpk,y〉WXE using the principle of deferred measurement.
In Round 3, after receiving the commitment y = (y1, . . . , yk) from the prover, V sends chal-
lenge coins c := (c1, . . . , ck) ∈ {0, 1}k . For the remainder of the protocol, we take the following
point of view. We assume that P and V share access to a register Y whose state is fixed forever to
be the standard basis state y. This is clearly equivalent to the real situation, as there P measured
Y and committed to the outcome y by sending it to V .
In Round 4, without loss of generality, the action of P consists of a general operation (that
can depend on c), followed by the honest action. The general operation is some efficiently imple-
mentable unitary Uc on WXYE. The honest action is measurement in the appropriate basis, i.e.,
for each i, WiXi is measured in the standard basis (if ci = 0) or the Hadamard basis (if ci = 1).
Equivalently, the honest action is (i.) apply HcWX :=
⊗k
i=1(H
ci)WiXi , i.e., for each {i : ci = 1} apply
a Hadamard to every qubit of WiXi, and then (ii.) apply standard basis measurement.
In the Verdict stage, the verifier first applies for each coordinate i the two-outcome measure-
ment corresponding to the Πhi,ski,ci from the single-copy protocol. The overall decision is then to
accept if the measurements in every coordinate accept. We let
(Πh,sk,c)WXY :=
k⊗
i=1
(
Πhi,ski,ci
)
WiXiYi
(13)
denote the corresponding acceptance projector for the entire k-copy protocol. The effective mea-
surement on |Ψpk〉WXYE is then described by the projection(
Π
Uc
h,sk,c
)
WXYE
:= (U†c )WXYE(H
cΠh,sk,c,yH
c ⊗ 1E)(Uc)WXYE . (14)
The success probability of P , which is characterized by the state |Ψpk〉 and family of unitaries
{Uc}c∈{0,1}n , is thus
E
h,sk,c
[〈Ψpk|ΠUch,sk,c|Ψpk〉]. (15)
The proof. Recall that Lemma 5 states that the projectors corresponding to the two challenges in
the single-copy Protocol 2 are nearly orthogonal, even when one takes into account the prover’s
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adaptively applied unitaries. We show that this property persists in the k-copy protocol. Specif-
ically, we show that all 2k challenges are nearly orthogonal (in the same sense as in Lemma 5)
with respect to any state |Ψpk〉 and any post-commitment unitaries Uc of the prover.
This can be explained informally as follows. For any two distinct challenges c 6= c′, there
exists a coordinate i such that ci 6= c′i, meaning that one enters a test round in that coordinate
while the other enters a Hadamard round. In coordinate i, by the single-copy result (Lemma 5),
the prover who succeeds with one challenge should fail with the other. A complication is that,
since we are dealing with an interactive argument, we must show that a violation of this claim
leads to an efficient single-copy prover that violates the single-copy result. Once we have shown
this, we can then apply it to any distinct challenge pairs c 6= c′. It then follows that we may
(approximately) decompose |Ψpk〉 into components accepted in each challenge, each of which
occurs with probability 2−k. We can then use this decomposition to express the overall success
probability of P in terms of this decomposition. As |Ψpk〉 is of course a normalized state, it will
follow that the overall soundness error is negligibly close to 2−k.
The “adaptive orthogonality” discussed above is formalized in the following lemma. Recall
that any prover in the k-fold parallel repetition of the Mahadev protocol can be characterized by
a state family {|Ψpk〉}pk that is prepared in Round 2 and a family of unitaries {Uc}c∈{0,1}k that
are applied in Round 4.
Lemma 6 (Adaptive orthogonality lemma). Let P be a prover in the k-fold parallel repetition of the
Mahadev protocol that prepares |Ψpk〉 in Round 2 and performs Uc in Round 4. Let a, b ∈ {0, 1}k such
that a 6= b and choose i such that ai 6= bi. Then there exists an n-qubit quantum state ρ such that for
every basis choice h,
E
sk
[
〈Ψpk|ΠUbh,sk,bΠUah,sk,a + ΠUah,sk,aΠUbh,sk,b|Ψpk〉
]
≤ 2α1/2hi ,ρ + negl(n) , (16)
where αhi ,ρ (defined in (5)) is the success probability with ρ in the MF protocol conditioned on the event
that hi is sampled.
Proof. Since we are proving an upper bound for a quantity that is symmetric under the inter-
change of b and a, we can assume that bi = 0 and ai = 1 without loss of generality.
We first claim that there exists a quantum state ρ such that
E
sk
[
〈Ψpk|ΠUbh,sk,bΠUah,sk,aΠUbh,sk,b|Ψpk〉
]
≤ αhi ,ρ + negl(n) (17)
for all basis choices h. For a contradiction, suppose that is not the case. Then there exists a basis
choice h∗ and a polynomial r such that for every state ρ,
E
sk
[
〈Ψpk|ΠUbh∗ ,sk,bΠUah∗,sk,aΠUbh∗,sk,b|Ψpk〉
]
> αh∗i ,ρ + 1/r(n) . (18)
We show that this implies the existence of an efficient prover P∗ for the single-copy Mahadev
protocol who violates Lemma 5. Define the following projector on WXYE:
Σa := U†a (H
a ⊗ 1E)((1⊗ · · · ⊗ 1⊗Π⊗ 1⊗ · · · ⊗ 1)⊗ 1E)(Ha ⊗ 1E)Ua . (19)
Here Π denotes the single-copy protocol acceptance projector for the Hadamard round, with key
ski and basis choice h∗i . In the above, Π acts on the ith set of registers, i.e., WiXiYi. The projector
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Σa corresponds to performing the appropriate Hadamard test in the ith protocol copy, and simply
accepting all other copies unconditionally. It follows that ΠUah∗ ,sk,a  Σa, and we thus have
E
sk
[
〈Ψpk|ΠUbh∗ ,sk,bΣaΠUbh∗,sk,b|Ψpk〉
]
≥ E
sk
[
〈Ψpk|ΠUbh∗ ,sk,bΠUah∗ ,sk,aΠUbh∗ ,sk,b|Ψpk〉
]
> αh∗i ,ρ + 1/r. (20)
The single-copy prover P∗ interacts with the single-copy verifier V∗ as follows.
• In Round 1, after receiving the public key pk∗ of V∗, initialize k − 1 internally simulated
verifiers, and set pk to be the list of their keys, with pk∗ inserted in the ith position. Let
h = (h1, . . . , hk) be the basis choices, and note that all but hi are known to P∗.
• Using the algorithms of P , perform the following repeat-until-success (RUS) procedure for
at most q = r4 steps.
1. Prepare the state |Ψpk〉 on registersWXYE, and then apply the unitary Ub.
2. Apply the measurement determined by Πh,sk,b (defined in (13)); for index i we can use
pk∗ because bi = 0; for the rest we know the secret keys.
3. If the measurement rejects, go to step (1.), and otherwise apply U†b and output the
state.
If the RUS procedure does not terminate within q steps, then P∗ prepares a state6 |Φ∗pk〉 by
performing Samp coherently on |0n〉W (see Round 2 of Protocol 2).
Note that if P∗ terminates within q steps, the resulting state is
|Φpk〉 :=
Π
Ub
h∗ ,sk,b|Ψpk〉
‖ΠUbh∗ ,sk,b|Ψpk〉‖
; (21)
otherwise |Φ∗pk〉 is prepared.
• For the Round 2 message, measure the Yi register of |Φpk〉 and send the result to V∗.
• When V∗ returns the challenge bit w in Round 3, if w = bi = 0, apply Ub (resp. 1) to
|Φpk〉 (resp. |Φ∗pk〉), and otherwise apply Ua. Then behave honestly, i.e., measure WiXi in
computational or Hadamard bases as determined by w, and send the outcomes.
By the RUS construction and the fact that bi = 0, the state |Φpk〉 or |Φ∗pk〉 is in the image of the
test-round acceptance projector in the ith coordinate. This means that, when V∗ enters a test
round, i.e., w = 0 = bi, P∗ is accepted perfectly. In other words, P∗ is a perfect prover7 and thus
satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 5.
Now consider the case when V∗ enters a Hadamard round, i.e., w = 1. Let
Ω := {sk : 〈Ψpk|ΠUbh∗ ,sk,b|Ψpk〉 > q−1/2} (22)
6To pass the test round, any efficiently preparable state suffices.
7While we used Πh∗,sk,b in the RUS procedure, and h
∗
i is (almost always) not equal to the hi selected by V∗, the
result is still a perfect prover state. This is because, as described in Protocol 2, the acceptance test in the test round is
independent of the basis choice.
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denote the set of “good” secret keys. For a good secret key, the probability of not terminating
within q = poly(n) steps is at most (1− q−1/2)q ≤ e−√q. Therefore, the success probability of
RUS for the good keys is 1− negl(n). Thus we have
E
sk|Ω
[〈Φpk|Σa|Φpk〉]Pr[Ω] ≤ αh∗i ,ρ + negl(n) (23)
where we let EX|E[ f (X)] := 1Pr[E] ∑x∈E p(x) f (x) denote the expectation value of f (X) conditioned
on event E for random variable X over finite set X with distribution p and function f : X → [0, 1].
Now we divide (20) into two terms and find
αh∗i ,ρ + r
−1
< E
sk
[
〈Ψpk|ΠUbh∗ ,sk,bΣaΠUbh∗,sk,b|Ψpk〉
]
= Pr[Ω] E
sk|Ω
[
〈Ψpk|ΠUbh∗ ,sk,bΣaΠUbh∗,sk,b|Ψpk〉
]
+ Pr[Ω] E
sk|Ω
[
〈Ψpk|ΠUbh∗ ,sk,bΣaΠUbh∗,sk,b|Ψpk〉
]
≤ Pr[Ω] E
sk|Ω
[
〈Ψpk|ΠUbh∗ ,sk,bΣaΠUbh∗,sk,b|Ψpk〉
]
+ q−1/2
≤ αh∗i ,ρ + negl(n) + q−1/2. (24)
Since q = r4, this is a contradiction. Therefore (17) holds, i.e.,
E
sk
[〈Ψpk|ΠUbh,sk,bΠUah,sk,aΠUbh,sk,b|Ψpk〉] ≤ αhi,ρ + negl(n).
It then follows that
E
sk
[
〈Ψpk|ΠUbh,sk,bΠUah,sk,a + ΠUah,sk,aΠUbh,sk,b|Ψpk〉
]
= 2E
sk
[
Re(〈Ψpk|ΠUbh,sk,bΠUah,sk,a|Ψpk〉)
]
≤ 2E
sk
[
|〈Ψpk|ΠUbh,sk,bΠUah,sk,a|Ψpk〉|
]
≤ 2E
sk
[
〈Ψpk|ΠUbh,sk,bΠUah,sk,aΠUbh,sk,b|Ψpk〉1/2
]
≤ 2E
sk
[
〈Ψpk|ΠUbh,sk,bΠUah,sk,aΠUbh,sk,b|Ψpk〉
]1/2 ≤ 2α1/2hi ,ρ + negl(n) (25)
as claimed.
We emphasize that, in Lemma 6, for each pair a 6= b the quantity is upper-bounded by the
acceptance probability of measuring some state ρ in the basis hi, and the quantum state ρ may be
different among distinct choices of (a, b) and i. This implies that that by standard amplification
(see Section 2.3), averaging over the distribution of the basis choice h, if P succeeds with one
particular challenge perfectly, it must fail all the others except with negligible probability. We
note that with this strategy, P succeeds with probability no more than 2−k + negl(n).
We also remark that the adaptive orthogonality is guaranteed under a computational assump-
tion. Assuming that no efficient quantum adversary can break the underlying security properties
based on plain LWE, the projections are pairwise orthogonal in the sense of averaging over the
key pairs (pk, sk) (efficiently sampled from a distribution depending on the instance) and with
respect to any quantum state |Ψpk〉 prepared with an efficient quantum circuit.
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While the above observation rules out the possibility of P succeeding perfectly at multiple
challenges, it does not rule out the possibility that P can succeeds with appreciable probability
for several challenges such that the total success probability is higher than in the above strategy. It
might seem possible to achieve such a strategy by coherently simulating several distinct provers
who perfectly win different challenges.
We rule out this possibility with one of our key observations: if with respect to a quantum
state, the projectors are pairwise nearly orthogonal, then with respect to the same state, the above
strategy is optimal. Since pairwise orthogonality holds with respect to any efficiently preparable
quantum state by Lemma 6, our parallel repetition theorem follows.
First, we state a key technical lemma:
Lemma 7. Let A1, . . . , Am be projectors and |ψ〉 be a quantum state. Suppose there are real numbers
δij ∈ [0, 2] such that 〈ψ|AiAj + AjAi|ψ〉 ≤ δij for all i 6= j. Then
〈ψ|A1 + · · ·+ Am|ψ〉 ≤ 1+
(
∑
i<j
δij
)1/2
. (26)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Observe that when the projectors are mutually orthogonal, we have A1 + · · ·+ Am  1 and the
bound clearly holds. Lemma 7 describes a relaxed version of this fact. In our application, the
projectors and the state are parameterized by the key pair, and we use this bound to show that
the average of pairwise overlaps is small.
We are now ready to establish our parallel repetition theorem.
Lemma 8. Let k be a positive integer and let {Uc}c∈{0,1}k be any set of unitaries that may be implemented
by P after the challenge coins are sent. Let |Ψpk〉 be any state P holds in the commitment round, and
suppose P applies Uc followed by honest measurements when the coins are c. Then there exists a negligible
function ǫ such that V1, . . . ,Vk accept P with probability at most 2−k + ǫ(n).
Proof. The success probability of any prover in the k-fold protocol is
Pr[success] = 2−k E
h
E
sk
[[〈Ψpk|∑
c
Π
Uc
h,sk,c|Ψpk〉]], (27)
where h = h(S) is obtained by sampling a random term S with distribution π (see Section 2.3).
Define a total ordering on {0, 1}k such that a < b if ai < bi for the smallest index i such that
ai 6= bi. Then by Lemma 7, we have
Pr[success] ≤ 2−k + 2−k E
h
[
∑
a<b
E
sk
[〈Ψpk|ΠUah,sk,aΠUbh,sk,b + ΠUbh,sk,bΠUah,sk,a|Ψpk〉]
]1/2
. (28)
By Lemma 6, there exists a negligible function δ such that
E
sk
[〈Ψpk|ΠUah,sk,aΠUbh,sk,b + ΠUbh,sk,bΠUah,sk,a|Ψpk〉] ≤ 2α1/2hi(a,b),ρab + δ(n) (29)
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for every pair (a, b). Here i(a, b) is the smallest index i such that ai 6= bi and ρab is the reduced
quantum state associated with a, b, as guaranteed by Lemma 6. Thus we have
Pr[success] ≤ 2−k + 2−k E
h
[
∑
a<b
(
2α1/2hi(a,b),ρab + δ(n)
)]1/2
≤ 2−k + 2−k E
h
[
∑
a<b
2α1/2hi(a,b),ρab
]1/2
+ 2−k
√(
2k
2
)
δ(n)1/2
≤ 2−k + 2−k
[
∑
a<b
2
(
E
h
[αhi(a,b),ρab ]
)1/2]1/2
+ δ(n)1/2
≤ 2−k + 2−k
[
∑
a<b
2s1/2
]1/2
+ δ(n)1/2
≤ 2−k + 2−k
[
2k(2k − 1)s1/2
]1/2
+ δ(n)1/2
≤ 2−k + s1/4 + δ(n)1/2 (30)
where the second and the third inequality hold by Jensen’s inequality. Since we may amplify the
soundness of the MF protocol (as discussed at the end of Section 2.3), s can be made negligible.
Thus the soundness error is negligibly close to 2−k.
We note that Mahadev shows the soundness error for a single-copy protocol is negligibly close
to 3/4 [Mah18], whereas Lemma 8 implies the error can be upper bounded by 1/2+ negl(n).
Mahadev obtains soundness error 3/4 + negl(n) by considering a general prover P who, for
each basis h, succeeds in the test round (characterized by Πh,sk,t) with probability 1− ph,t, in the
first stage of the Hadamard round (characterized by Λh,sk,h,1) with probability 1− ph,h, and in the
second stage of the Hadamard round (characterized by Λh,sk,h,2) with probability at most
√
ph,t +
ph,h + αh,ρ + negl(n) for some state ρ [Mah18, Claim 7.1]. These contributions are combined by
applying the triangle inequality for trace distance. This analysis is loose since Λh,sk,h,1 and Λh,sk,h,2
commute, and P must pass both stages to win the Hadamard round.
Finally, Lemma 8 immediately implies the following theorem.
Theorem 9. Let M be the Mahadev protocol, and let Mk be its k-fold parallel repetition. Under the LWE
hardness assumption, the soundness error of Mk is at most 2−k + negl(n).
4 Round reduction by Fiat-Shamir transformation
In this section we show that the Fiat-Shamir transformation can be used to reduce the number
of rounds in the k-fold parallel Mahadev protocol from four to two, while keeping both the
completeness and the soundness errors negligible.
4.1 Fiat-Shamir for Σ-protocols in the QROM
The Fiat-Shamir (FS) transformation turns any public-coin 3-message interactive argument, also
called a Σ-protocol, into a single-message protocol in the random oracle model (ROM). A Σ-
protocol consists of the following type of interaction between V and P :
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Protocol 3 (Σ-protocol for a language L). Both V and P receive the instance x ∈ L.
Round 1. P sends a message y (called the commitment).
Round 2. V samples a random c (called the challenge) uniformly from a finite set C.
Round 3. P responds with a message m (called the response).
Verdict. V outputs V(x, y, c,m), where V is some Boolean function.
In the Fiat-Shamir transformation, the prover generates their own challenge by making a
query to a uniformly random oracle function H, and then computing their response m as usual.
The transformed protocol thus does not require V to send any messages.
Protocol 4 (FS-transformed protocol for L). Both VFS and PFS receive the instance x ∈ L and are
given access to a random oracle H.
Round 1. PFS sends a message (y,m).
Verdict. VFS outputs V(x, y,H(x, y),m).
In the standard approach, one proves that the Fiat-Shamir transformation preserves sound-
ness in the so-called Random Oracle Model. In this idealized cryptographic model, all parties
receive oracle access to a uniformly random function H. Against quantum adversaries, there is a
well-known complication: a quantum computer can easily evaluate any actual instantiation of H
(with a concrete public classical function) in superposition via
UH : |x, y〉|z〉 7→ |x, y〉|z⊕H(x, y)〉 .
We thus work in the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM), in which all parties receive
quantum oracle access to UH.
The reduction for Σ-protocols in the QROM. While this is nontrivial to prove, the Fiat-Shamir
transformation remains secure in the QROM, up to somemild conditions on the Σ-protocol [DFMS19].
The proof proceeds by a reduction that uses a successfully cheating proverAH in the FS-transformed
protocol to build a successfully cheating prover S in the Σ-protocol. This can actually be done in
a black-box way, so that S only needs to query A.
We let Y,C,M, E denote the registers storing the commitment, challenge, response, and
prover workspace, respectively. A q-query prover AH is characterized by a sequence of unitaries
A0, A1, . . . , Aq on registers Y,C,M, E. After i queries, it is in the state
|ψHi 〉 := AiUHAi−1UH . . . A1UHA0|0〉YCME . (31)
In a normal execution, AH first prepares |ψHq 〉, then measures Y and M in the standard basis and
sends the outcome to VFS (see Protocol 4). The success probability is
Pr
H
[V(x, y,H(x, y),m) = 1, (y,m) ← AH(x)]. (32)
The prover SA begins by internally instantiating a quantum-secure pseudorandom function8
F [Zha12]. It then chooses a random index i ∈ {0, . . . , q} and prepares the state |ψFi 〉. Note
8If an upper bound on q is known, a 2q-wise independent function would suffice.
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that the queries of A are answered using F . Next, the simulator performs a standard basis
measurement on register Y and sends the outcome y to V . After V returns a random challenge
Θ, SA constructs a reprogrammed oracle, denoted by F ∗Θy, with
F ∗Θy(x, y′) =
{
Θ if y′ = y
F(x, y′) otherwise (33)
which will be used for the remaining simulation of A. SA then tosses a random coin b and
performs the following:
1. If b = 0, SA runs A with the reprogrammed oracle F ∗Θy for query i+ 1, . . . , q.
2. If b = 1, SA runs A with the original oracle F for query i+ 1 and with F ∗Θy for query
i+ 2, . . . , q.
To generate the message to V , SA measures registers Y,M and obtains the outcomes y′′,m. If
y′′ 6= y then SA aborts; otherwise SA outputs the measurement outcome (y,m). The success
probability of SA is
Pr
Θ
[V(x, y,Θ,m) = 1 : (y,m)← 〈SA,Θ〉], (34)
where 〈SA,Θ〉 denotes the interaction between V , who sends a challenge Θ, and SA in the Σ-
protocol. The following theorem establishes that the success probabilities of SA and AH are
polynomially related.
Theorem 10 (Quantum security of Fiat-Shamir [DFMS19, Theorem 2]).
Pr
Θ
[V(x, y,Θ,m) = 1 : (y,m) ← 〈SA,Θ〉]
≥ 1
2(2q+ 1)(2q+ 3)
Pr
H
[V(x, y,H(x, y),m) = 1, (y,m) ← AH(x)]− 1
(2q+ 1)|Y| . (35)
4.2 Extension to generalized Σ-protocols
In this section, we show that Fiat-Shamir also preserves soundness for a more general family of
protocols, which we call “generalized Σ-protocols.” In such a protocol, the verifier can begin the
protocol by sending an initial message to the prover. The Mahadev verification protocol for BQP
is an example of such a protocol, where this initial message is an LWE public key.
Generalized Σ-protocols. A generalized Σ-protocol starts with the V sending an initial message
which is computed from V ’s private randomness. The interaction that follows is similar to a Σ-
protocol.
Protocol 5 (Generalized Σ-protocol). Select a public function f : R× L → W , a finite set C, and
a distribution D over R. The protocol begins with prover P and verifier V both receiving an instance
x ∈ L.
Round 1. V samples randomness r ∈ R from distribution D and computes message w = f (r, x),
which is sent to P .
Round 2. P sends a message y to V .
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Round 3. V responds with a uniformly random classical challenge c ∈ C.
Round 4. P sends a response m to V .
Verdict. V outputs a bit computed by a Boolean function V(r, x, y, c,m).
The k-copy Mahadev protocol under parallel repetition is a generalized Σ-protocol: The dis-
tribution D describes the distribution for the secret key, and f computes the public key. In
Section 4.2, we show under the FS transformation, a quantum-secure generalized Σ-protocol re-
mains secure.
Fiat-Shamir for generalized Σ protocols. The FS transformation for generalized Σ-protocols is
similar to Protocol 4. In particular, in the Verdict stage, V computes c = H(x,w, y) (see Protocol 5
for the definition of w and y) and accepts if and only if V(r, x, y, c,m) = 1.
Protocol 6 (FS transformation for generalized Σ-protocols). Select a public function f : R× L →
W , a finite set C, and a distribution D over R. The prover P and verifier V both receive an instance
x ∈ L and are given access to a random oracle H.
Round 1. V samples randomness r ∈ R from distribution D, and computes message w = f (r, x),
which is sent to P .
Round 2. P sends a message (y,m) to V .
Verdict. V computes c = H(x,w, y) and then outputs a bit computed by a Boolean function
V(r, x, y, c,m).
To show that generalized Σ-protocols remain secure under FS transformation, similarly to
the idea for Σ-protocols in Section 4.1, we give a reduction. Conditioned on any randomness r,
the prover AHr (x) := AH(x, f (r, x)) is characterized by unitaries A0, f (r,x), . . . , Aq, f (r,x). The prover
in the Σ-protocol B runs SAr and outputs its decision. Given the success probability of A, we
establish a lower bound on that of B, formally stated as follows.
Lemma 11 (Fiat-Shamir transformation for generalized Σ-protocols). Suppose that
Pr
r,H
[V(r, x, y,H(x, f (r, x), y),m) = 1 : (y,m) ← AH(x, f (r, x))] = ǫ. (36)
Then
Pr
r,Θ
[V(r, x, y,Θ,m) = 1 : (y,m) ← 〈B,Θ〉] ≥ ǫ
2(2q+ 1)(2q+ 3)
− 1
(2q+ 1)|Y| . (37)
Proof. Conditioned on r = r∗, the success probability of A is
Pr
H
[V(r, x, y,H(x, f (r, x), y),m) = 1 : (y,m) ← AH(x, f (x, r))|r = r∗]
= Pr
Hr∗
[V(r∗, x, y,Hr∗(x, y),m) = 1 : (y,m) ← AHr∗ (x)] =: ǫ(r∗), (38)
where Hr∗(x, y) := H(x, f (r, x), y) and by definition Er[ǫ(r)] = ǫ. Since H is a random function
over L×W ×Y → C, for any r∗, Hr∗ is a random function over L×Y → C. Then we know that
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the success probability of SAr∗ , by Theorem 10, is
Pr
Θ
[V(r∗, x, y,Θ,m) = 1 : (y,m) ← 〈SAr∗ ,Θ〉] ≥ ǫ(r
∗)
2(2q+ 1)(2q+ 3)
− 1
(2q+ 1)|Y| . (39)
Taking the average over r∗, we have
Pr
r,Θ
[V(r, x, y,Θ,m) = 1 : (y,m)← 〈B,Θ〉]
= E
r∗
[
Pr
Θ
[V(r∗, x, y,Θ,m) = 1 : (y,m) ← 〈SAr∗ ,Θ〉|r = r∗]
]
= E
r∗
[
ǫ(r∗)
2(2q+ 1)(2q+ 3)
− 1
(2q+ 1)|Y|
]
=
ǫ
2(2q+ 1)(2q+ 3)
− 1
(2q+ 1)|Y| (40)
as claimed.
Lemma 11 immediately gives the following theorem.
Theorem 12. If a language L admits a generalized Σ-protocol with soundness error s, then after the Fiat-
Shamir transformation, the soundness error against provers who make up to q queries to a random oracle
is O(sq2 + q|Y|−1).
Proof. Suppose that there is a prover who succeeds in the transformed protocol with success
probability ǫ. Then by Lemma 11, we may construct a prover who succeeds with probability
at least ǫ
O(q2)
−O
(
1
q|Y|
)
. By the soundness guarantee, we have ǫ
O(q2)
−O
(
1
q|Y|
)
≤ s and thus
ǫ ≤ O(q2s+ q|Y|−1).
By Theorem 12, if both s and |Y| are 2ω(log λ) for security parameter λ, the soundness error
of the transformed protocols remains negligible in λ against an efficient prover who makes q =
poly(λ) queries.
5 Two-round verification of quantum computation
Now we put the above results together to establish a 2-message verification protocol for BQP,
described in Protocol 7, with negligible completeness and soundness error, in the QROM.
Protocol 7 (A 2-message verification protocol for quantum computation).
Setup. Both P and V receive an instance of Problem 1, namely H = ∑S pS 1+mSS2 and set n = |H|.
Choose a security parameter λ = poly(n) and set k = ω(logλ). Both P and V are given
access to a hash function H.
Round 1. V samples k terms S1, . . . , Sk and computes hj = h(Sj).
For each copy j ∈ [k] and each qubit i, if hji = 0, V samples (skji , pkji) ← GenG(1λ);
otherwise V samples (skji, pkji)← GenF (1λ). V sends pk = (pkji)i∈[n],j∈[k] to P .
Round 2. P sends V strings (y,w, t) where y = (yji)i∈[n],j∈[k], w = (wji)i∈[n],j∈[k] and t = (tji)i∈[n],j∈[k].
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Verdict. V computes c = H(H, y). For each j ∈ [k], V computes a bit vj as follows.
1. If cj = t, V sets vj = 1 if Chk(pkji ,wji, tji, yji) = 1 for each bit i and 0 otherwise.
2. If cj = h, V performs the following:
(a) For each qubit i with hji = 0, run (eji, xbji,yji)← InvG(skji, yji). For each qubit i
with hji = 1, run x0,yji ← InvF (skji, 0, yji) and x1,yji ← InvG(skji , 1, yji) to get
both preimages. Then compute e = tji · (x0,yji ⊕ x1,yji)⊕ wji.
If any of the above the algorithms returns reject for any i, or tji is trivial (e.g., 0n,
see [BCM+18]), set vj = 0. Otherwise store e as the witness to the next check.
(b) Discard all the bits of e but the ones specified in term Sj. V sets vj = 1 if the
witness satisfies M−mS (defined in Protocol 1) and 0 otherwise.
V accepts if vj = 1 for every j ∈ [k].
The following is then a direct consequence of Theorem 9 and Theorem 12.
Theorem 13. Protocol 7 is a two-round, quantum-prover, classical-verifier protocol for the class BQP,
with negligible completeness and soundness errors.
6 Discussion
We have shown that any language in BQP can be verified with a 2-message protocol while main-
taining negligible soundness and completeness error. We achieve this by applying the Fiat-Shamir
transformation to a parallel-repeated version of the Mahadev protocol.
This work raises several interesting open questions. First, is it possible to prove the soundness
of our protocol when the oracle H is instantiated with a concrete hash function? Our current
analysis applies only in an idealized model, i.e., in the QROM.
It is also natural to study parallel repetition for more general QPIAs. While it is known
that parallel repetition does not reduce the soundness error for any protocol, can we prove a
parallel repetition theorem for any QPIA after some modification (such as to include random
terminations)? Natural examples include the protocols of [GV19,VZ19,BCM+18].
Finally, is it possible to make BQP verification completely non-interactive? Since the Mahadev
protocol makes crucial use of a public-key primitive, such a result would presumably have to use
a different approach and/or different cryptographic tools.
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A Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7. Let A1, . . . , Am be projectors and |ψ〉 be a quantum state. Suppose there are real numbers
δij ∈ [0, 2] such that 〈ψ|AiAj + AjAi|ψ〉 ≤ δij for all i 6= j. Then
〈ψ|A1 + · · ·+ Am|ψ〉 ≤ 1+
(
∑
i<j
δij
)1/2
. (26)
Proof. Let α := 〈ψ|A1 + . . .+ Am|ψ〉. We have
α2 ≤ 〈ψ|(A1 + · · ·+ Am)2|ψ〉 (41)
= α+ ∑
i<j
〈ψ|AiAj + AjAi|ψ〉 (42)
≤ α+ ∑
i<j
δij (43)
The inequality (41) holds since |ψ〉〈ψ|  1, and thus
〈ψ|(A1 + · · ·+ Am)|ψ〉〈ψ|(A1 + · · ·+ Am)|ψ〉 ≤ 〈ψ|(A1 + · · ·+ Am)2|ψ〉. (44)
The equality (42) holds since each Ai is idempotent, and thus
〈ψ|(A1 + · · ·+ Am)2|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|A21 + · · ·+ A2m|ψ〉+ ∑
i<j
〈ψ|AiAj + AjAi|ψ〉
= 〈ψ|A1 + · · ·+ Am|ψ〉+ ∑
i<j
〈ψ|AiAj + AjAi|ψ〉. (45)
Now observe that for β > 0, x2 ≤ x + β implies x ≤ 12 (1+
√
1+ 4β) ≤ 12(1+ (1+ 2
√
β)) =
1+
√
β. Thus α ≤ 1+
√
∑i<j δij as claimed.
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